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The aim of this paper to determine how structure and governance in the dairy sector in 
four different regions in the European Union alter as a result of the change in EU’s 
dairy policy. For this purpose two models of structural change are developed and 
interviews are held. Results differ between the regions depending on whether or not 
they are export oriented, their growth in farm size and farm exit rates. 
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Fresh milk is a highly perishable product and is therefore, because of high transport 
cost, processed in the region of production. Processed products can be divided into 
two groups. First, products that are produced and consumed locally. This is because of 
relatively high transport cost of fresh products (e.g. drinking milk) and local tastes. 
Second, processed products as butter and skimmed milk powder and certain types of 
cheeses that are internationally traded because of relatively low transport cost. 
Looking at demand and supply, we can also observe two types of production regions. 
First, regions where supply is focussed on meeting local demand. Second, regions that 
produce a surplus of processed products that is transported over longer distances or 
exported. These differences can create a price wedge for milk between regions (e.g. 
Parliament of Australia, 2010). Trading cost including transport cost lead in a region 
that is not exporting to a higher milk price than in a region that is exporting. This 
price difference can be offset by differences in regional production and processing 
cost. 
 
With the yearly increase in milk quotas and the abolishment of the milk quotas in the 
European Union (EU) in 2015, the dairy sector (both dairy farming and milk 
processing industry) is approaching a new more liberalised market situation. It is 
expected that milk prices will fluctuate more and the average milk price level will be 
lower than in the last decade (Bouamra-Mechemache et al., 2008). Because of the 
lower price and the increased opportunities for farmers to expand production, a 
restructuring of the EU’s dairy sector is likely. The number of dairy farms will 
decrease relatively fast and farms will increase in size to exploit scale economies 
(Jongeneel and Tonini, 2007). However, regional differences can be expected. In 
                                                 
1 The work in this paper is funded by the EU FP7 project ‘Assessing the multiple Impacts of 
the Common Agricultural Policies (CAP) on Rural Economies (CAP-IRE). 
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exporting regions an increase in milk production might take place. In less productive 
regions milk production might decrease and in some more isolated regions where 
production tends to fall below local demand it is likely that milk processors or 
supermarkets will give extra support to dairy farms to guarantee supply of fresh 
processed products or prevent a complete production stop. The latter can be for 
instance seen in a liberalised market as the Australian (e.g. Parliament of Australia, 
2010) but also in Eastern Europe where milk processors  provide technical services to 
dairy farms to secure supply and improve milk quality (Dries, et al., 2009). This also 
shows that the governance structure between farmers and processors is influenced by 
the demand and supply situation in a region (van Bekkum and Nilsen, 2002; Tacken, 
et al., 2009). So structure and governance in the dairy sector are expected to alter as a 
result of changes in EU’s dairy policy where structure is defined as the number and 
size of dairy farms. Until now the causes of regional heterogeneity in structural 
development have been largely ignored. 
 
The aim of this paper to determine how the structure and governance in the dairy 
sector in four different regions in the European Union: North-Holland (the 
Netherlands), Centre (France), Bulgaria and Scotland alter as a result of the change in 
EU’s dairy policy.  
 
To answer the research question we develop and apply a model of structural change 
and make use of interviews with stakeholders to see whether or not they confirm the 
model results. Taken into account regional differences will increase insight in the 
factors that shape the future structure of the dairy sector in the EU. 
 
In section 2 we provide a description of the study regions. Section 3 presents the 
model. Section 4 discusses the followed methodology with respect to the interviews. 
Section 5 presents the model results and the interviews. Section 6 provides some 
conclusions and discussion. 
 
 
2. Description regions 
 
To get insight in regional differences within the EU, a literature research is conducted 
on the structure of the dairy sector in four case study regions taken up by the CAP-
IRE project, namely: namely: the Netherlands (more specific the province North-
Holland, North East Scotland (UK), South East Planning Region (Bulgaria) and 
Centre (France). Table 1 provides some information of the case study regions. Table 2 
gives an overview of the production and export of dairy products per country.  
The countries were selected because of characteristics of the dairy sector. In the 
Netherlands, the dairy farms are capital intensive, land intensive, and relatively large 
(FADN, 2009). The Netherlands is export oriented. Cheese is the main product. There 
is a limited number of processors. More than 90% of all milk is processed by 
cooperatives (PZ, 2009). Dairy farmers are clearly constrained by the milk quotas. It 
is expected that for the Netherlands farmers will expand their milk production after 
quota abolition. 
 
French farms mainly are diversified and extensive. The French dairy sector had a 
relatively low restructuring rate (Perrot et al., 2009). The milk processing industry is 
characterized by the production of diversified products by many processors. 
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Approximately 45% of all milk is collected by cooperatives while 34% is processed 
by cooperatives (Orlait, 2005). Just as in the Netherlands French farmers in Centre are 
constrained by the milk quotas. 
 
Bulgaria has more than 150,000 small farmers with in general 1-2 dairy cows (MAF, 
2007). Only 20% of the produced milk is delivered to processors. This milk mainly is 
produced by larger farms. The remaining 80% is produced for self consumption or for 
the local market. There are many small scale local processors present and a few 
international large scale processors (Dries et al., 2008). There are no Bulgarian 
cooperatives processing milk. Milk quotas do not form a restriction. Production is 
much more restricted by the low milk quality. 
 
In 2007, North East Scotland as NUTS 3 region build up from the NUTS 2 regions 
Aberdeen, Aberdeenshire and North East Murrey only had 70 farms specialised in 
dairy production (Scottish government, 2008). In Scotland in total there were 1,429 
dairy farms. The number of dairy farms and dairy cows  has declined rapidly in the 
last years. This is probably the result of the introduction of new alternatives to dairy 
farming such as the production of  biofuel crops and the low profitability of the sector 
(Scottish government, 2008). The number of dairy farms in the whole of Scotland 
decreased by 8.9% in the period 2004-2007 while during that period, the number of 
dairy farms in the North East Scotland decreased by 17.6% (Scottish Government, 
2007). Production is processed and consumed locally. In Scotland milk quotas are not 
filled. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
 
Table 2 shows production and exports of processed products (not per region). For 
Scotland we do not have reliable data. In some cases exports are higher than 
production which can be explained by a reduction in stocks and re-exports. Data show 
that the Netherlands is very export oriented but also France and Bulgaria are 
exporters.  
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
 
3. Theoretical model 
 
From the previous section it follows that the regions differ with respect to the 
structure of dairy farming and market situation. In this section we develop a model to 
analyse the structure in the dairy sector in these regions. Structure is defined as the 
number and size of farms. Structure is by definition changing if the number of farms 
changes through exit and farms growing in size. Structure is assumed to be 
determined by: 
• Personal characteristics of the farmers. In this group of explanatory variables we 
have age, education and presence of a successor. With more alternative 
opportunities to dairy farming farmers are expected to stop earlier just as it is the 
case with older and more educated farmers and farmers with a successor. 
• Relative profitability of dairy farming. Factors that determine this relative 
profitability are milk price, prices of other outputs and variable inputs and supply 
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• Growth in farm size. In this group of explanatory variables we have productivity 
growth but also investment costs. An increase in productivity implies that with the 
same production factors more milk can be produced. This leads to an increase in 
milk production.  
• Market size. Supply quotas and local consumer demand are expected to influence 
structure. With supply quotas an increase in production per farm automatically 
will lead to less farms. If production becomes less than local consumer demand  
processors can stimulate production to avoid excess capacity. Finally, new 
government policy could be aimed at maintaining production a certain level in a 
region, e.g. to secure joint production of dairy and wildlife and landscape. 
 
Below we present two simple models of structural change. For simplicity we assume 
that farms are of the same size. Moreover, the models are recursive dynamic, so no 
optimisation over time takes place. 
 
 
Model I: Total production is variable 
The production of a farm is given by equation (1). We assume that production per 
farm grows per year with a fixed growth rate r e.g. as a result of productivity growth.  
Moreover, we assume that production is determined by relative profitability. Profit 
equals revenues minus variables costs. If profit of dairy farming increases relative to 
the profit of its alternatives production will increase. The model assumes that a 1% 
change in relative profitability leads to a 1% change in production per farm. We 
assume production per farm to be equal for all farms. 
 
The number of farms in a year changes compared to the previous year with a 
(negative) growth rate (equation 2). This growth rate reflects the personal 
characteristics leading to an autonomous reduction in the number of farms. We 
assume a fixed yearly percentage reduction. 
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ty : average farm production with exogenous profit in year t 
d
tπ : profit in dairy farming in year t 
o
tπ : profit of alternative production in year t 
r : productivity growth rate 
tN : actual number of farms in year t 
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tY : total production in year t 
i : autonomic growth rate in number of farms. 
 
In this model production and the number of farms do not influence each other. Total 
production can grow or shrink without any restriction. If for example profitability 
falls, production falls (also in future years) but the number of farms is not affected. 
 
 
Model II: total production is fixed 
In comparison to model I we now assume that total production is fixed, e.g. because 
of the size of the local consumer market or because of supply quotas. In the model the 
fixed total production or market size will influence both production per farm and the 
number of farms.  
 
Production is given by equation (4) or (5). Just as in model I we assume that 
production per farm grows yearly with a fixed percentage. Moreover, we assume that 
production is determined by relative profitability. If profit of dairy farming increases 
relative to the profit of alternatives production will increase.  
 
The number of farms is by definition equal to the total production or market size 
divided by the production per farm (equations 8). If total production in a region is 
fixed the number of farms and production per farm are variable. There are two 
possibilities. First, it could be that the number of farms determines production. The 
number of farms is on an autonomic trend (equation 10) and is determined by the 
number of farms in the previous year times the (negative) growth rate. Production in 
this case is given by equation (5). Second, if relative profit is exogenous production is 
determined by equation (4). This production determines the optimal number of farms. 
The first possibility is relevant if the number of farms as determined by the autonomic 
trend is lower than the number of farms in option 2 (equation 9). This is because the 
number cannot be larger than the autonomic trend (we assume there is no entry). In 
case the number of farms is determined by the autonomic trend the production is 
larger than if it is not. In the model this is possible if profit of dairy farming goes up. 
This extra profit could be the premium processors pay to farmers to stimulate 
production to fill their production capacity. Given that this extra profit is positive it 
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ty : average farm production with exogenous profit in year t 
e
tπ : exogenous profit in dairy farming in year t 
te : extra profit in dairy farming in year t 
o
tπ : profit in alternative production in year t 
tY : fixed total production in year t 
trend
tN : number of farms according to trend in year t. 
 
To illustrate the model suppose profitability falls in dairy farming, e.g. because of the 
dairy policy reform. In that case production per farm goes down and the number of 
farms increases or falls less given the total fixed production. There are two 
possibilities. First, the number of farms is (still) below the autonomic trend. Profit is 
still exogenous and total production equals the markets size. Second, the number of 
farms is above the autonomic trend. This is however not possible and therefore the 
actual number of farms is set equal to the number given by the autonomic trend. To 
increase production per farm, and therefore lower the number of farms, farmers need 





Both models do not describe the coordination mechanisms or governance in the dairy 
sector. Government policy can influence the relative profitability of dairy farming. 
Model I assumes that production can grow or shrink without any restrictions. 
Moreover, it is implicitly assumed that the milk processors process the extra milk 
produced or process less milk if needed. Model II assumes that relative profitability 
has to increase if production tends to fall below the fixed total production level. There 
are two possible cases. First, in case fixed production is determined by the size of the 
local consumer market it will be milk processors or supermarkets that pay a higher 
price or provide market and technical services to dairy farms that also increase 
relative profitability of dairy farming. This is what actually happens already in many 
markets, e.g. in Eastern and Central Europe (Dries et al., 2009) and some regions in 
Australia (e.g. Parliament of Australia, 2010). Second, in case fixed production is a 
government target the government has an incentive to take action. This could be 
through directly or indirectly subsidising dairy farming in a region. Notice that in case 
of a supply quota and production falling below the quota level there is no market 
mechanism available that to prevent this. In case supply tends to be higher than the 
quota level there has to be an extra reduction in the number of farms. In practice in 
countries with tradable milk quotas (e.g. the Netherlands) this takes place by selling 
quota rights by less efficient producers to more efficient producers.  
 
 
4. Interviews  
 
Interviews with experts and stakeholders of the dairy sector in the case studies were 
used to get insight in their expectations about the structure and governance in the 
dairy sector as a result of the EU’s dairy policy reform. 20 semi-structured interviews 
were held in France and the Netherlands. In Bulgaria, 1 semi structured interview and 
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14 surveys with open questions were hold. The explanation on the survey questions 
took place during a short presentation given to the respondents. Table 3 gives an 
overview of the interviewed persons, in this paper further referred as ‘respondents’. 
The interviews were analysed by coding the findings from the interviews 
systematically into the core categories that together hold a coherent framework using 
the grounded theory as described in Neergaard and Ulhøi (2007). In the first phase, 
open coding, categories were named and their properties and dimensions determined. 
In the second phase, axial coding, categories were linked at the level of dimensions 
and properties. In the third phase, selective coding, the core categories were refined to 
integrate them into a coherent framework. No distinct differences were found in 
perception of specific interviewed subgroups on the core categories.  
 







Before the models can be used the growth rates of farm production and farm exit  
have to be determined. Moreover, the production per farm, the number of farms in a 
region and total production in a region have to be known. We use the data for 2003 
and 2007 given in Table 1 and choose the growth rates of farm production and farm 
exit such that the model exactly reproduces the actual change in production per farm, 
total production and farm numbers from 2003 to 2007. We have here to make the 
assumption that relative profitability of dairy farming does not change in this period. 
Next we use 2007 as the base year and simulate the model over a 10 year period 
assuming that the values of the growth rate of farm production and farm exit remain 
constant and are equal to their average values in the period 2003-2007. Because in the 
EU’s dairy policy reform supply quotas are gradually increased just as intervention 
prices and export subsidies will be decreased we assume that as from 2008 on relative 
profitability of dairy farming drops by 10% in all four regions (Bouamra-
Mechemache et al., 2008).  
 
So we have two scenarios: 
• Base scenario: relative profitability of dairy farming does not change. 
• Scenario I:  relative profitability of dairy farming decreases by 10% in 2008. 
 
In the Netherlands model I is relevant because we expect total production to increase 
as a result of quota abolition. In France it is to be expected that the government wants 
to maintain regional milk production at the present quota level in regions less suitable 
for milk production. Centre is such a region. This makes that model II is relevant for 
France. In Bulgaria quotas are not binding so quota abolition is not expected to lead a 
constraint on total production, so model I seems relevant. In Scotland we expect that a 
further reduction in profitability would lead to a decrease in production. However, we 
assume that this will not happen because milk processors and retailers want to 
maintain milk production at the present level. This makes model II relevant. Table 4 
summarises the model inputs and also shows the effect on the number of farms and 
production in case of both scenarios. As mentioned before we perform the simulations 







The results for the Netherlands (model I) show that with a 10% drop in relative 
profitability compared to the base scenario the production per farm and total 
production still increase but less. Compared to the base scenario the production per 
farm and total production are 10% lower. This is because in model I a 1% reduction in 
relative profitability leads to a 1% reduction in production per farm. The number of 
farms is in both scenarios the same because it is, as mentioned in the model 
description, independent of relative profitability.  
 
For France (model II) we see only a small difference between both scenarios. Total 
production is for both scenarios constant and the total number of farms is largely 
determined by the autonomic trend. Actually the reduction in farm numbers is a bit 
less in scenario I because to compensate for the fall in production per farm more 
farms have to be active. Results not presented here show that without the condition 
that total production should remain constant total production would increase 0.29% in 
the base scenario and decrease by 9.74% in scenario I. Production per farm would go 
up by 90.13% in the base scenario and 71.11% in scenario I. The number of farms 
would go down with 47.25% in both scenarios. This shows that to keep total 
production at the fixed level relative profitability of dairy farming has to be increased 
in scenario I to prevent a reduction in total production. This increase is 11.08%. This 
has to come from milk processors or government. 
 
For Bulgaria (model I) we see a large decrease in the number of farms and a strong 
increase in production per farm. As a result total production falls with 5.03% in the 
base scenario and with 14.53% in scenario I. Just as in the Netherlands the reduction 
in the number of farms is independent from the scenario. Total production and 
production per farm are in scenario I 10% lower than in the base scenario. Given this 
outcome it is likely that the processors in Bulgaria will try to prevent the reduction in 
production. So instead of model I model II is relevant. If this is the case the number of 
farms falls with the same percentage (75.58%) as in model I and the production per 
farm increases more (309.55%). These changes are the same in both scenarios with 
model II. To make it possible that total production remains constant relative 
profitability has to be increased. For the base scenario this is 5.30% and for scenario I 
17.0%. This support has to come form milk processors directly via higher prices or 
indirectly through technical support as is already now the case. 
 
For Scotland (model II) we see that the differences between both scenarios are small. 
The number of farms is largely determined by the autonomic growth in farm numbers, 
and given the fixed total production this results in the production per farm. In the 
alternative scenario the number of farms falls a bit less, this is because of the larger 
reduction in production per farm in that scenario. Results not presented here show that 
if total production would not be fixed (model I) it would grow with 10.71% in the 
base scenario and would decrease with 0.36% in scenario I. Farm numbers would go 
down with 31.33% in both scenarios as they are in model I not dependent on the 
relative profitability. This result shows that only in scenario I some extra support is 
needed to fix total production at the initial level. From this it follows that probably 




5.2  Interviews 
 
In the Netherlands respondents strongly indicate that the cooperatives feel the 
obligation to collect all milk supplied by their members. Many Dutch dairy farmers 
currently feel limited by the production constraints from the quota. They are expected 
to increase scale, until other factors affecting their production will become limiting. 
They indicate this would be environmental and labour constraints. The dairy 
cooperatives in the Netherlands (>90% of all milk is supplied to cooperatives) are 
expected to process the milk and export largely the processed products.  
 
Many French stakeholders consider the potential concentration of milk production in 
certain parts of France and the disappearance in other parts as an undesirable 
development and they indicate the government shares this opinion. To prevent milk 
processors from terminating milk collection in less efficient regions as Centre, there 
currently are ideas to impose national guidelines for milk supply contracts and to 
introduce a collective that manages the milk supply in France on a national level. 
 
Long term contracts are already frequently used in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian 
respondents indicate to expect that production standards for physical milk quality will 
increase. From some of the Bulgarian respondents and from the literature (see e.g. 
Dries et al., 2008: 23) follows, that many Bulgarian milk processors experience 
shortage of high quality milk. Processors in Bulgaria focus on assuring the quality 
standards of the EU and are expected to try to decrease the costs accompanied with 
this. From the literature follows that some milk processors have set up their own dairy 
farms (see Dries et al., 2008). Also from the interviews follows that some 
stakeholders expect a further chain integration, drop in farm numbers and an increase 
in production per farm.  
 
In Scotland it is expected that contracts between retailers and farmers, guaranteeing a 
minimum price for all the supplied milk based on the production cost of the farmer, 
will become standard. The motivation for the Scottish retail lies in the benefits of a 
secured supply of high quality fresh milk as Scotland is a net importer of dairy 
products and the Scottish milk production is expected to decline further. 
 
Table 5 summarises the results. 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
 
The CAP reform implies for some countries and regions not a large change as milk 
quotas have not been binding in the past. The only remaining effect is that prices 
become more volatile. For these countries and regions the trend in the structural 
change continues. This could imply that production falls below a threshold at which 
milk processors or retailers take action to maintain total milk production at a certain 
level (e.g. Bulgaria). For other countries and regions there is a large effect as milk 
quotas are binding and quota abolition implies a shock. This is especially true if 
national governments or milk processors not undertake action as it is the case in the 
Netherlands. The change will be smaller if national governments try to regulate 
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production as in France. For Scotland results are mixed. The model suggests that not 
much extra support is needed to maintain total production at the same level while the 
interviews suggest different.  
 
The model developed is rather simple but it does illustrate well the effects to be 
expected. Key variables in the model are growth in farm size, autonomous decrease in 
the number of farms (exit) and market size. The model could be extended in many 
directions, e.g. distinguishing between different groups of farms, making farm growth 
and exit endogenous, taking into account price volatility and estimation of the effect 
of relative profitability on production. Despite this the model gives insight in the 
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Table 1. Total milk production (in 1,000 tons), number of farms with milk 
production, average milk production per farm (in tons) and milk 















543 578 483 483 73 77
 
201 196













7169 7415 6491 6892 5670 7204
 
3677 3846
Source: FADN, 2009 
 
 
Table 2. Production of dairy products in 2007 in 1,000 tons and exports in tons 
per selected country. 
 The Netherlands France Bulgaria
Cheese produced 732.0 1,754.7 68.6
Cheese exported  562.6 650.7 16.0
Fresh milk produced 750.0 3,764.0 337.2
Fresh milk exported n.a. n.a. n.a.
Butter and –oil produced 129.2 337.2 1.4
Butter and –oil exported 154.0 62.8 1.1
Condensated milk produced 330.7 65.7 0.4
Condensated milk exported 274.0 70.7 77.0
Milk powder produced2  1009.0 181.5 193.3
Milk powder exported  151.5 249.5 n.a.
Source: PZ, 2009 
 
 
Table 3. Overview of interviews; divided in subcategories 
  Farmers Chain Policy makers, public 
advice, research 
Total 
France 3 2 5 10 
Bulgaria 4 2 9 15 
Netherlands 3 3 4 10 
Total 10 7 18 35 
 
                                                 
2 Skimmed and non skimmed milk powder together 
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Table 4. Model input and effect (percentage change) in 2017 compared to 2007 





Farm growth % 5.30 7.40 16.29 5.45
Exit rate % -3.54 -6.86 -14.50 -4.09
Total production 
constant 
No Yes No Yes
  
Results (% change):  
Base scenario:  
Number of farms -27.70 -47.40 -75.58 -37.97
Average production 
per farm 
59.17 90.13 288.94 61.22
Total production 15.08 0 -5.03 0
  
Scenario I:  
Number of farms -27.70 -47.39 -75.58 -37.27
Average production 
per farm 
43.25 90.06 250.05 59.41













































- Milk price 
determined in free 
market. 












Bulgaria -Continuation of 
long-term contracts
-Increase of milk 
processed by 
processors  





























Scotland Contracts to 
guarantee milk 
supply. 
Decrease 
number of 
farms and 
increase in 
farm size. 
Local 
production for 
fresh market. 
No quantity 
regulation on 
national scale. 
 
Source: interviews 
 
 
